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The Week

NOW that the election is imminent, it is time to call the attention of liberal and disinterested citizens to one consideration which many of them overlook. The campaign, as it has progressed, has increasingly posed the question of what values for American life the voter proposed to affirm by his vote. Many liberals are supporting Mr. Davis because he has declared himself in favor of immediate coöperation with Europe and are opposing Mr. La Follette because they are justifiably sceptical of some of the specific proposals in his platform. But reasons of this kind which might properly determine a choice among candidates who were divided only about policies fade into insignificance when the several candidates are asserting different conceptions of the meaning of American nationality. The Republicans have insisted that whatever is in America is on the whole right. The American nation is to seek the fulfillment of its collective life by preserving its existing institutions, practices and social classifications substantially intact. The Democrats through their mouthpiece, Mr. Davis, are more willing than the Republicans to reconsider the existing conduct of American government, but they do not admit that the tendency of the existing system raises any question of ultimate values. They reaffirm that the meaning of American nationality was correctly formulated at the end of the eighteenth century by Thomas Jefferson. They are now exhibiting a significant disposition derived from their Jeffersonian tradition to treat the economic issue as their predecessors treated the issue of slavery, viz., as chiefly a local affair, about which a national government or a national party should remain indifferent or irresponsible. Finally Mr. La Follette has consistently proclaimed that the Progressives are the modern spokesmen of the ideals which the Fathers of the Republic labored to embody in the institutions and practices of their countrymen. They hoped to found a commonwealth of free, self-respecting and socially equal citizens, whose individual independence was the expression of a wide diffusion among the people of economic and political power. That is not the kind of commonwealth which the United States has come to be, and the Progressives' proposals to modify American laws, institutions and practices are intended to effect its revival. A vote for Mr. Coolidge affirms and for the most part consciously affirms the ideal of an arrested America. A vote for Mr. Davis, no matter what the intentions of the voter, affirms an irresponsible and drifting America. A vote for Mr. La Follette affirms a progressive America, which is fully aware of its inherited national purpose and is not afraid to demand those changes in conduct, institutions and ideas which are necessary to redeem it.

WITH the political campaign closing, the broad outlines of the policy pursued by each party in it also become clearly visible in review. The Republican program has been from the beginning to try to frighten the country into hysterics by its bogey of Bolshevism. The Democrats' main argument has been based on the corruption of the Harding régime—"turn the rascals out and put us in." The La Follette campaign has of course centred about economic issues, emphasizing the necessity for "breaking the grip of private monopoly." In none of these policies is there any element of surprise.

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The La Follette campaign has been fought on the issue which to the Senator from Wisconsin and his supporters seems the paramount one in American life today. The Democrats have attacked Republican corruption because it was about the only point on which they were able to make a vigorous campaign. As for the Republicans, they were undoubtedly correct in believing from the first that the real menace to a Coolidge victory was Senator La Follette. La Follette's strength is nearly all in states which the Republicans in a "normal" year would either be sure of carrying or have a good chance to carry, and without some of these states Coolidge cannot hope for a majority in the Electoral College.

THE Coolidge campaign has been chiefly remarkable for two things: the contempt for the voters' intelligence with which false issues have been created, and the effrontery of the appeals to tariff-protected manufacturers to pay over part of their spoils to the Republican campaign chest. Not in a generation has there been a campaign like this one, in which the G. O. P. has relied exclusively upon straw men of its own creation in appealing to the people, and has not come to grips with any of the really vital questions of the day. The Republicans have said that La Follettism means Bolshevism, that the proposal that Congress should consider submitting to the states a constitutional amendment limiting the power of the Supreme Court to override federal legislation, means the destruction of the Constitution, and that Progressives and Democrats are in a plot to deadlock the election and make Charles W. Bryan President. Our readers do not need to be told how remote from reality such accusations are.

WHILE they talk long and loud about these perils of their own invention, they have not a word to say about the unparalleled waste and corruption of the Harding régime; not a word about their failure to bring relief to the distressed farmers; not a word about their official foreign policy, which has been, "not a policy but a predicament;" not a word about the Ku Klux Klan and its appeal to ignorant bigotry; not a word about the huge burden which the tariff lays on all consumers in order to line the pocketbooks of a few capitalists—of whom the Secretary of the Treasury is not the least; not a word about the extraordinary change of front as to the personal character of Mr. Coolidge who, until the death of Harding, was voted by the leading politicians to be such a failure that he had no chance of being renominated as vice-president.

THE Treasury officials may shout themselves black in the face: they will never convince anyone with eyes in his head that political motives had nothing to do with the choice of the time for opening the income tax returns to public inspection. Coolidge and Mellon and the conservative wing of the Republican party were bitterly opposed to the publicity provision of the revenue act. La Follette and the Progressives inside the party and outside of it forced it through. The publicity provision reads obscurely; no ordinary citizen would have concluded that it authorized the press to publish his name in a list to be examined with eager interest by everybody. The Treasury department has given a rude jolt to the taxpayer's indifference. Its action says, in effect: "This is what the radical crowd has done to you. How do you like it?" A large proportion of the income tax payers won't like it at all. They are less likely to stay at home on election day, or to keep their contributions to the Republican campaign fund down to a minimum. Their indignation is not going to focus itself on the Treasury for giving them a jolt at this time, but on the political groups responsible for the publicity provision in the law. And they will set it down to the credit of the administration that it knows how to club them out of their somnolence.

ELECTION eve boomerangs are, however, tricky things to handle. The income tax payers are after all a rather inconsiderable minority, and not a very popular minority. Their violent denunciation of the principle of publicity will seem to hosts of people like an admission that they have something in their tax returns they need to conceal. The class which does not pay income taxes may also have been jolted into a resolution to go to the polls this year. Secretary Mellon obviously assumes that the radicals will not wake up so promptly as the conservatives, and that the net effect of making the tax returns public will be beneficial to Coolidge. But Secretary Mellon interprets upper middle class public opinion much more successfully than general public opinion. We may recall his conviction that the whole country was behind his famous plan for detaxing the rich. Only the upper middle class was for it, as he has probably learned by this time.

AS to the substance of the question whether income tax returns should be made public, we are for publicity. We recognize that occasionally it is an inconvenience, or even a grave disadvantage for an individual to have the facts of his income known to the public. We also recognize and respect the wish of many persons for privacy in this part of their lives. But we hold that the distribution of income among the several classes of the population, and among the members of each class, is a matter of great public concern. The rate at which private fortunes multiply is not a private matter. Every historian will admit that it has had much to do with the rise and decline of states in the past. It has a definite bearing on the future of our own nation. Our American democracy has not only tolerated, but approved, the successful individual who rises to fortune. It has assumed that great services are elicited by great rewards. There appears, however,

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to be no good reason why the individual who is permitted to rise into an exceptional position should feel aggrieved if he is required to show exactly what he is getting for the services he is supposed to perform. It is true that the income tax returns, as now compiled, do not show this. That is, however, a defect that could easily be remedied by making accessible to the public the record of all the tax payer's income, both taxable and exempt.

THE British Labor government appears to have handled the alleged Zinoviev letter with unpardonable ineptitude. In the first place, they did nothing about it until their enemies pressed them to action under threat of publicity. In the second place, they treated it as purely a foreign office matter, not a matter for the whole government to discuss and agree upon, although it vitally concerned the government as a whole. Finally, the action taken, a sharp note to the Russian government, could only have been justified after the authenticity of the letter had been established. Knowing as much as they do about the activity of Russian forgers, the Labor government should have been wary at a time like this when their enemies are making the most of the Red peril as an electioneering device. Apparently the foreign office assumed that Zinoviev was just the kind of pernicious fool to write such a letter as this, and acted on the assumption. Zinoviev, so far as we can ascertain, is in fact something of a pernicious fool. He would, we believe, be quite capable of blundering into a delicate situation and of giving aid and comfort to the reactionaries, expecting thereby to advance, somehow, the world revolution. He does not, however, have the reputation for cheap lying; neither has the Soviet government. And when both Zinoviev and the Soviet government brand the letter as a forgery and demand an impartial inquiry to determine its origin, the Labor government stands convicted of amateurish precipitateness, at the very least.

S. STANWOOD MENKEN has been guilty of many howling stupidities, but he has never sunk to such a profound depth of ignorance and folly as in his attack on the Countess Karolyi. What he charges her with is complicity in the policies of her husband, Count Karolyi, who, Americans ought to know, stands out as the finest, bravest figure in contemporary European history. All his life Count Karolyi has fought valiantly against the clique of Hungarian magnates whose oppression of the subject nationalities and dreams of conquest played a far greater part in making the World War inevitable than the German Kaiser or Poincaré or the militarists surrounding the Tsar. Throughout the War Count Karolyi resisted the insane ambitions of the Austrian and German militarists. When the War was definitely turning against the Central powers he was called to form a government, and did his best to bring about a settlement of the nationality question in the Dual Monarchy under which the economic advantages of the old union might have been reconciled with the aspirations of the nationalities. He also sought to effect a redistribution of the great landed estates which make the Hungarian magnates a menace to European peace, and, as proof of his profound good faith, voluntarily distributed his own immense estates, making himself a poor man. But he had come into power too late. The Bela Kun revolution drove him into exile, and the Horthy counter-revolution, which restored the oligarchy of Hungarian militarists to power, was as hostile to Karolyi as the Communists had been. Karolyi in exile has, however, never despaired, and to this day is working courageously for peace and democracy in Central Europe. We think that Mr. Hughes, who knows what Karolyi has done and suffered in a cause which commands the sympathy of every honest American, ought to apologize publicly to the Countess Karolyi for the indecent ravings of S. Stanwood Menken. He disgraces not only himself but his country.

THE Chinese war has experienced one of those reversals which are not uncommon in military operations in the Orient. General Wu Pei-fu, overlord of the Peking government, while busily engaged in meeting the attack of Chang Tso-lin from Manchuria, has found himself stabbed in the back by General Feng Yu-hsiang. The latter, whose lack of enthusiasm for General Wu has been suspected for some time, suddenly rose against his master, forced the latter's henchman, President Tsao Kun, to sign a mandate declaring the war at an end, and then deposed him. Naturally, General Feng is strongly suspected of having been bribed or persuaded by Marshal Chang. He insists that this is not so, and that he has acted solely in the interest of peace and a desire to bring to an end a fratricidal war, which was ruining the country. Whatever explanation is the correct one, General Wu, caught between two fires, is in a precarious position. If General Feng was sincere in wishing to bring the war to an end, he may have accomplished that purpose, though at the heavy price of dominance by the Manchurian dictator over all China except the Canton government.

WHEN the present campaign is ended, a good many daily newspapers will have little reason to be proud of the part they have played in it. Partisan lines have been drawn with unusual strictness this year. The leading newspapers of the important cities have, as a rule, given generous space to all three presidential candidates and have reported them fairly; but the exceptions to this standard, particularly in the smaller communities, have been numerous and painful. Particularly has the La Follette movement suffered misrepresentation and unmerited abuse at the hands of editors who seem to be so badly frightened that all notion of what is de-

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manded in the way of fairness by the ethics of the profession leaves their heads. An example more or less characteristic is the reception given to the very serious charge against General Dawes in connection with the Lorimer bank scandal. Most of the Republican newspapers carefully refrained from printing a line about these charges when they were first made. Not until John Barton Payne produced his famous "defense" did the Republican press rush to the fray, printing in detail the justification of something their readers supposedly had never heard of. Whatever may be said of such procedure as politics, it is bad journalism. We hope it will prove to be bad politics as well.

THE parsimonious view of the proposal of a federal subsidy to needy public schools is, of course, that it is just another raid on the treasury. But the simplicity of this verdict is obtained at the expense of limitation; under this rule the federal treasury is conceived only in terms of disbursements. The facts of this particular case, however, turn upon the power of the federal government to collect. The National Educational Association has just issued a chart, prepared by its division of research, which puts the emphasis where it belongs. A contrast of the expenditures per child upon education in the five richest and in the five poorest states gives a ratio of about five to one. Education thrives where wealth abounds. Furthermore, and obviously, the federal government is the only possible equalizing agency for discrepancies between the states. The N. E. A. summarizes the situation thus: "Equality of educational opportunity is possible only when school money is collected where wealth exists and expended where children live." The argument is incontrovertible. A contrary view is parsimonious not so much of public funds as of ordinary good sense.

THE National Educational Association has also just issued a research bulletin, "Facts on the Public School for American Education Week," for the use of school authorities and others in the observance of the week of November 17. The charts and discussions which it contains are definitely focussed upon education and the public schools. That is to the Association's credit, though, of course, no less could have been expected. But no amount of statistics upon the growth or value of public school education can offset the disproportion of the week's program as it was worked out by the American Legion, the federal Bureau of Education and the Association, acting jointly. Out of seven days just one has been devoted to the schools in their character as patrons of intelligence and disseminators of information. Six other "civic functions" compete with this one on equal terms. Any one who takes the exercises of the week seriously will be led to suppose that American schools are six parts public and one part school. The N. E. A. is an organization of school people. If it does not subscribe to this ratio it ought not merely to let its light shine under the bushel of a research monograph but to issue a candid challenge to the official program of the week.

THE American press is exhibiting only the slightest interest in the Franco-German negotiations for a commercial treaty. Yet this treaty may have an important bearing on our own commercial relations. Before the War we enjoyed the privileges implied in the European interpretation of the most-favored-nation principle. Germany might induce France to cut duties on steel. Immediately we gained the benefit of the reduction, without making any concession of our own, by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause in our treaty with France. It now appears that France means to place her commercial relations on another basis. She refuses to make a most-favored-nation treaty with Germany, but proposes instead to cut duties on specific German goods in return for corresponding concessions by Germany on specific French goods. We cannot expect either country to continue long to give us the benefit of reductions that have been thus bought and paid for. Moreover, if such a commercial policy were adopted by Germany and France it would soon be followed by other countries, not only in Europe, but in Asia and America. And unless we prove more adroit at commercial diplomacy than we have been in the past we shall find ourselves generally in a least-favored-nation position.

PERHAPS we shall not mind if our trade suffers from discriminations. Americans who travel in Europe are now discriminated against, and not only take it, but take it lying down. Before an American can enter any European country except Switzerland and Belgium he is taxed ten dollars for having his passport viséd. An Englishman goes where he pleases, paying nothing whatever for the examination of his passport. An American entering Italy from a country in which cholera or the plague appears sporadically becomes subject to sanitary control. It takes twenty-one days before the suspicion of disease is lifted. Within that period the American is required under pain of a fine of five hundred lire and of imprisonment up to six months, to report to the sanitary authorities within twenty-four hours after arrival at his temporary destination. A British subject encounters no such requirement. He exhibits his passport and goes blithely through, warranted clean of plagues and fluxes by the fact of his nationality. The discrimination in the matter of visa charges is easily explained. America levies a visa charge of ten dollars on the rare traveler to America. Almost all European countries retaliate by levying ten dollars on the frequent American traveler to Europe. It is a fair guess that for every ten dollars our country collects in this way the European countries collect a hundred dollars from Americans. The sanitary discrimination can only be explained on the

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ground that experience has shown the European officials that Americans, under the benevolent protection of Mr. Hughes, may be kicked around with impunity.

What Has the Campaign Accomplished?

FROM the point of view of the Progressives the object of the campaign which is now drawing to a close was primarily educational. They sought by nominating Senator La Follette for President to convince the American people that the issue raised by the present distribution of economic power and the present economic class bias of American government should be and was bound to become perennial in American political contests. They hoped to collect and to mobilize a new national party which was fully equipped by its organization, its ideas and its impulse to insist on the reality and the urgency of this issue. In what sense, if any, can they be honestly said to have succeeded?

So far as advertising the economic issue is concerned they have enjoyed a considerable but still limited success. For reasons which we shall consider presently, neither the Republicans nor the Democrats have deigned to discuss the economic issue on its merits and they have by this refusal discouraged public opinion from seeking or obtaining light about its meaning. But they have not succeeded in preventing economic and social questions from hanging like an oppressive cloud over the political landscape and obscuring competitive issues. The Democrats, for instance, sought to concentrate popular attention on the startling and sinister evidences of Republican corruption and ineptitude. They wished to convince the American nation that the really important and the highly practical object of its solicitude should be to substitute government by honest and harmonious Democrats for government by dishonest and discordant Republicans. The raising of the economic issue by Senator La Follette exposed the unreality of this issue and the futility of the proposed alternative. By associating both the corruption and the ineptitude of Republican rule during the past four years with the renewed preponderance in the counsels and the management of the standards and the interests of private business, the Progressives have blunted the edge of the chief Democratic campaign argument. For the same reason the Republicans were unable to make much headway with their attempt to convince voters of their eminence as the party of efficiency and economy. Just in so far as the voters distinguished the economic issue as of major importance they were bound to lose their interest in the sham battles and the less radical and dramatic controversies with which the two older parties have in the past so frequently entertained them and diverted their attention.

The Republicans have by their conduct of the campaign assisted the Progressives in arousing American popular consciousness to the importance if not the meaning of the economic issue. They have proclaimed Progressivism to be an assault on American national security and popular welfare in the hope thereby of bulldozing and scaring doubtful Democratic and other voters into overlooking Republican misconduct and into voting for Coolidge. They have denounced an orderly constitutional agitation which seeks the gradual transformation and the functional improvement of the existing economic and legal system in the same violent language which they might justifiably have used against a party which condemned all property as robbery. By so doing they have committed themselves to the affirmation that all radical agitation looking towards economic reconstruction deserves to be treated as a class conspiracy against American national security. The speeches of the Republican leaders have stimulated the further growth of a thoroughly benighted and Bourbon state of mind among the members of the party. At the same time they have confirmed the Progressives' impression of the hopeless and self-righteous class bias of the Republican party as a whole. It is now demonstrably composed of favored groups and individuals who will not surrender their privileges except as the result of conscious and irresistible economic and political pressure. The attitude of its leaders has justified the necessity for a farmer-labor progressive party which will dedicate itself to the improved distribution of economic and political power in America.

The Republican party, when it assumed its existing intransigent and intractable attitude, played the game of the Progressives. It has helped them to advertise and dramatize the economic issue and to create a determination to resist which will demand a permanent Progressive party for its expression. It looks now as if the large element in American public opinion which wishes to prevent the economic issue from becoming the bone of contention between two dominant political parties will finally be obliged to abandon the middle of the road and drift to one side or the other. Mr. Davis has, of course, represented this element throughout the present campaign. He has treated the Progressive candidate and platform not as if they were dangerous or ominous, but as if they were unimportant and ephemeral. He and his fellow Democrats have avoided any but the most incidental discussion of the economic questions which the Progressives believe to be paramount and irrepressible. Thus by a significant paradox the most effective enemy of the Progressive party is not the Republicans who fulminate against it, but the Democrats who seek to ignore it. The Republican attitude stimulates the coming of a Progressive party into existence and affirms the paramountcy of the economic issue. The

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Democratic attitude seeks to emasculate the issue and to dismiss the proposed new party as unnecessary.

In our opinion the Democrats will fail in their present attempt to denationalize the question of the distribution of economic power. For the next fifty years the most important task of loyal and patriotic American citizens will be that of overcoming the existing tendency of the American nation to become a self-satisfied and intolerant plutocracy and of rebuilding with a more humane end in view the legal and economic foundations of American life. It will take a long process of education to convince many of the most disinterested and intelligent people in the United States of the importance and the unavoidability of this job. They do not understand the function of conflict in the social economy of a democratic people. They like to believe in the possibility and desirability of avoiding conflict by placing expert knowledge at the service of the well-intentioned search for immediate agreements. They will be slow to understand that conscious conflict is often the only means by which the obstacles to coöperation are removable. But they will be obliged to choose, and it is essential that when they choose the better and the larger number of them shall choose the Progressive alternative. Just at present a majority of them tend to look the other way, but as the economic issue becomes illuminated as well as advertised, they will find it increasingly hard to stomach the essential unintelligence and obscurantism of the Republican attitude. It is the task of Progressives, to mold the ideas and policy of their party so that, without ceasing to be consciously a party of conflict, they will win the support of individual liberals by becoming also the party of social discovery, technical invention, administrative adjustment and ultimately of national reconciliation.

Where Revolution Stalks

AN insidious revolution, says President Nicholas Murray Butler, is quietly eating its way, like a microscopic fungus, through the heart-of-oak of American government. In spite of all our loyalty to the institutions of our fathers we have been doomed to see them gradually softened and brought to impotence by processes that have been, hitherto, so subtle that we have not even perceived their nature. Conceived as a federation of sovereign states, our national life has become more centralized year by year until the time has arrived when the states out of which the nation has been built are little more than hollow shells, empty of real meaning and authority. More important, with this removal of the protection of local government the individual citizen has been exposed increasingly to the domination of a central governing power that has become with each successive Congress more intrusive and more dictatorial. Nothing is any more beyond the province of federal authority to regulate. In our home life, in our social communication, in the conduct of our private businesses we have now to submit to the dictation of constitutional amendments and congressional enactment, and the end is not in sight. But that end is revolution.

The purpose for which President Butler drew this picture in his recent speech to the Institute of Arts and Sciences at Columbia University was to sound a call to arms. Dr. Butler is "confident the American people would overwhelmingly oppose changing their present form of government." Doubtless he is right. The American people are in a more complacent mood just now than any other in the world, naturally, since they are more comfortable than any other people. But the process of change which has stolen silently upon them through the concatenation of circumstances over which no political body has control can be checked neither by complacency nor by a call to arms, though it be sounded through the trump of Gabriel. You cannot indict nature. This revolution is not only silent and insidious; it is inevitable. Among economists it is known as the industrial revolution.

Now the industrial revolution is obviously not confined to America. England is quite generally taken as the seat of its inception. It was in England that an obscure conjunction of accidents brought forward a large and powerful middle class, and fostered commerce and manufacture, science and discovery and ultimately the mechanical inventions which revolutionized that industry and so have altered the whole character of modern civilization. Furthermore, the mechanical arts have spread with unprecedented rapidity to all parts of the earth. No valley is any more too remote for the power drill, no steppe too barren to be traversed by rail. Nevertheless the United States is the foster child of the industrial revolution. As a world power we have no pre-industrial past. The life history of the nation coincides precisely with the inception, the development and the consummation of industrial society. In no other country have the mechanical arts had their way so thoroughly.

Figured in terms of industrial development, this is our gain. But viewed as a problem of control, it is our greatest hazard. The fact is that mechanical industry is almost completely beyond the control of existing governments. That is not strange. The governments of today are outgrowths of the governments of yesterday. Thus the American Constitution, framed in the late eighties of the last century but one, undertakes to preserve the peace of farmers and handicraftsmen, and to regulate the scanty commerce of the stagecoach and the clipper ship. When it was adopted there was no machine industry anywhere; but no sooner had it come into operation than the people whose basic law it is became through a century and a half the greatest industrial and commercial nation of the world. The

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instrument that was framed to control the operations of fishers, farmers and cotton planters now exercises jurisdiction over Standard Oil Companies, the United States Steel Corporation, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the du Pont chemical, and other, interests, the highly disorganized coal operators and the highly concentrated bankers.

Needless to say, it has made a mess of it. As the job has grown, all sorts of subterfuges have been required. Emergency regulations of every conceivable kind have been passed, investigations have been conducted, new departments of government created. A great many of these moves have been promptly pronounced contrary to the provisions of our eighteenth century Constitution. Others no doubt would have been had their significance been apparent at the time. Thus two of the most potent instruments of our present system of government are the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Reserve Board—neither of them contemplated in the Constitution nor dreamed of for a hundred years after its formation. The general confusion could not be illustrated better than by the necessity which has arisen again and again of warping to the interpretation of the most extensive cases of industrial control the amendment passed in 1866 to protect the southern negro in the possession of his meagre chattels.

All these facts are notorious. Yet in the face of them the president of our greatest university is so ignorant or so arrogant as to leave them completely out of his reckoning. Alarmed by the shoddy patchwork of most of our recent attempts to control our own industrial life, he has either the stupidity or the audacity to propose a return to the simple local government of the founding fathers. What annoys him is not the precariousness of the control exercised by the present instruments of government, but the absurdities of subterfuge to which legislation has been driven under the Constitution. Behold our impotence, he says in effect. We have sought to free the negro, and he is still in chains. We have sought to banish liquor, and the country swims in it. And now, follies upon follies, we are essaying to keep children out of the factories and to raise the national standard of literacy.

To propose such a program as a return to eighteenth century liberalism is simply preposterous. The stalwart independence of our forefathers was in the first place a defiance of aristocratic privilege. As it gathered economic bearing it reflected the eighteenth century economic doctrine of laissez faire, and that, as any reader of Adam Smith may discover, was an attack on mercantile monopoly intrenched behind royal grant and special tariff. The equivalent of that doctrine today would be a program, whether of letting be or regulation, aimed at the industrial monopolies of our own time. Is that what President Butler envisages in his version of laissez faire? Absolutely not. He would curb the federal government so as to leave the schools to the munificence of the rural community, the children to the tender mercies of immigrant parents and industrial employers, liquor to the refined ministrations of the brewer and distiller and the negro to the grandfather clauses of local governments. He is against federal control; but he is against federal control of industry and federal control of the rich. He is against taxing New York to pay for the schools of Idaho. He is against coercing employers in the matter of child labor. He is against federal protection of common labor.

But in particular President Butler is against amendments. This is the crux of the matter. He wishes to preserve the Constitution. He laughs cynically at the ineffectiveness of these patch-work regulations. But of course they are ineffective. Any attempt at control of modern industrial machinery that is based on our federal Constitution, as it now stands, will be a relatively ineffective subterfuge. Proper control might perhaps be decentralized; but it would necessarily be decentralized not to local areas, to the county sheriffs and the town meetings that were the very symbol of good government to our rural ancestors, but to the industries, to the corporations themselves, which are the real units of power in the modern world. Such a decentralization would spread out the governing power not from Washington to Gopher Prairie but from Congress to the board room of the United States Steel Corporation, from the White House to the council chamber of J. P. Morgan and Company.

The cry for government by the original Constitution without amendment is a cry for a government that is impotent against the real powers of the present civilization. Those powers are not ephemeral. They are as permanent as civilization itself, a silent proof of the inward revoluton. President Butler recalls Voltaire's aphorism that most dead governments have disappeared through suicide. Let him reflect further that most governments have committed suicide by clinging to a rigid formula just too long in the face of a changing social order.

Barriers to Progressivism

IN an article published in our last issue Mr. Walter Lippmann charges the New Republic "with making a virtue of Progressive ambiguities while it expends its scorn on Democratic and Republican ambiguities." A review of the political articles published in the New Republic during the past six months would not, we believe, substantiate this charge. The New Republic has not erected the ambiguities of the Progressive program into a virtue. We have claimed only that such ambiguities were, considering the sources from which a new party must be derived, unavoidable, and, if the proposed party realized its promise, remediable. Ob-

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viously the Progressives are not yet wrought into a political body which is coherent and mature enough to take over the national government, and, in the event of victory, to translate a definite program into legislation. The candidacy of Mr. La Follette is an educational preparation for a possible future radical party, recruited chiefly from those economic groups whose members live by labor and which have reason to be discontented with their opportunities in the property-ridden America of today. Such a party may or may not be organized and prove equal to its mission, but if it is ever to emerge it must begin by being formless, ambiguous in its ideas and composed of unassimilated ingredients. Its difference from the older parties will not consist in its consistency and adequacy to its appointed task. It will consist in the fact that the Progressives are brought together and set in motion by an outlook towards a goal.

The Democratic and Republican parties are all dressed up, but they have nowhere to go. They reached maturity not later than 1860. Until recently they could count on the allegiance of their members and agreed sufficiently upon their attitude towards the important issues of the day. They were not being invited to any entertainment which was too smart for their wardrobe. Like all political parties they suffered from dissensions and schisms, but the ambiguities in their ideas and the miscellaneousness of their membership did not prevent them from combining into sufficiently competent governing bodies. They are not capable of such combination now. Both of them are disconcerted by the impact of an issue which they are as mentally and morally unprepared to deal with on its merits as the Whig and Democratic parties of 1850 were unprepared to deal with the issue of Negro slavery. If this economic issue is as fundamental and inexorable as the New Republic takes it to be, and if the Progressives prove capable of bringing it home to the mind and conscience of the American people, they are bound finally to bring about a drastic realignment of political parties.

While it looks as if both the old parties were disintegrating under the assault of the economic issue, they are disintegrating in different ways and with tendencies toward different results. For the moment the Republicans are defying the Progressive attack and are expecting by the defiance to gain more than they lose. They are ready to abandon some of their former support among the wage-earners and farmers, in so far as those economic groups become conscious of divergent interests, but they expect to compensate for the loss by setting up the Republican party as the exclusive spokesman of American business and by gradually earning the allegiance and the confidence of conservative Democrats. In this sense the Republican party is already rallying and reforming after the shock of the first attack, and it appears to be succeeding in many parts of the country in offsetting its losses to the Progressives by its gains from the Democrats. But it remains doubtful whether in the long run it will dare to risk its popularity on a policy, whose tendency is to govern the country in the interest chiefly of the business man, and to ignore the divergence between his interest and that of the other economic groups.

In spite of superficial testimony to the contrary, the Democrats are more disconcerted by the intrusion of the economic issue than are the Republicans. In June of this year the party occupied an unusually strong position. Its leaders had the opportunity of nominating a candidate who would associate an attack on Republican corruption with an attack on government by and for business, and if they had seized the opportunity they could have defeated Mr. Coolidge and prepared their party to act as the future agent of economic reconstruction. But they did not rise to the occasion. They became furiously excited over an issue about which in the event of victory the national government could do nothing. The distracting battle over the Klan seems to have been indirectly and in some measure unconsciously prompted by their fear of the consequences of letting the economic issue dominate their proceedings. From the point of view of the Progressives who gathered at the same time in Cleveland the Democrats certainly behaved like the rattled father who goes to the club and gets fighting drunk in order to ease his apprehensions while the baby is being born. This interpretation was rendered increasingly plausible when the Democratic party ended its deliberations by selecting among its possible candidates the man whose recent private and professional life most completely disqualified him from dealing thoroughly with the economic issue. In as much as the Democratic leaders doubted the importance of the issue and shrank away from it, their decision was creditable to their honesty, but it was not creditable to their progressivism.

The Democrats cannot expect to have it both ways. They cannot allow themselves to be rattled by the intrusion of a major issue while at the same time plausibly pretending that their evasion of it morally and mentally prepares them to deal with it. The decision of the New York convention risked the immediate future of the Democratic party on the supposition that the economic discontent of 1924 would prove to be as fugitive as the economic discontent of 1896 and 1912. This expectation may be correct. If it is correct, the Democratic party will emerge from the crisis unscathed, and the Progressive protest of 1924 will increase by one the number of tombstones in the well populated graveyard of American radical agitation. But if it is not correct, and if a new party dedicated to the aggressive assertion of the economic issue should survive, the Democratic party is bound to undergo a more or less radical transformation. It will then become a minor sectional bloc which, in order to exercise any power in politics, will have to form a new alliance with other pools of voters. What kind of alliance

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it will negotiate will depend upon the strength which the Progressives develop in their contest with the Republicans.

According to Mr. Lippmann a national party is obliged to be a loose coalition of state parties, which deal with local differences by compromise and thus combine, illogically but still effectively, into "a strong central government with home rule." This theory of the necessary composition of American parties is framed to guarantee the survival of Mr. Davis's party. The Democracy ever since slavery became a national issue, has usually striven to preserve its unity and power through avoiding decisive choices on contentious questions of domestic policy. The means of avoidance has always been an appeal to the doctrine of national irresponsibility and states rights. Its 1924 convention was rent by the conflicts among the sectional interests of southern reactionaries, western progressives, and northern political machines dependent for their power chiefly on industrial populations, and it consequently dodged almost every significant issue. Mr. Lippmann is, of course, right in pointing out that any national party must reconcile groups with divergent points of view, but he is much less right in assuming that these groups are largely geographical as they were during the pioneer period when the Democratic party was formed. Economic issues tend to ignore local barriers. When competitive markets for almost every product are nation-wide, when single railroad systems traverse half a continent, when single corporations own manufacturing establishments in a dozen states, when farmers' organizations and labor unions find their memberships scattered throughout the country, it is absurd to hold that the economic questions which divide the people can be adjusted by compromises among state parties.

The impotence of the Democratic party to deal with economic issues arises from the fact that its strength in different sections of the country is derived from opposing economic groups. No fruitful economic compromise can arise from a coalition of southern cotton mill owners with northern cotton mill employes, of western grain growers with eastern attorneys for railroads and bankers. If economic issues increasingly dominate the life of the people, their suppression in a party convention cannot contribute to the survival of the party. A party coalition capable of combining reconciliation of local differences with an effective national economic policy must be formed rather by a combination of farmers, wage-earners and others of generally similar interests on the one hand and on the other of the groups who wish to give a free hand to all kinds of business. Such compromises as appear in the Progressive program are chiefly among groups having the same tendency on major economic questions, but local or other differences on less immediately important issues. A federal party of the Democratic type, as visualized by Mr. Lippmann, is bound to blur issues such as railroads, child labor, and the power of labor organizations. It is bound to over-emphasize conflicts over such issues as the Ku Klux Klan, the personal ambitions of candidates, and remote foreign policies. A truly Progressive party, formed by a coalition of economic rather than local groups, would tend to suppress the minor and transitory issues and seek its unity in broad economic policies.

Mr. Lippmann in his criticism of the Progressives nowhere alleges that the economic issue is not ultimately as important and as inexorable as they declare. He only disparages its immediate importance in view of the ambiguities of outlook and the infirmities of conviction among the Progressives themselves. He insists that a new party, as an agency for the aggressive assertion of this issue is, considering the necessarily federal composition and unprincipled conduct of American partisan organizations, neither possible nor desirable. Surely his argument, if it proves anything, proves more than a progressive can tolerate. In order to justify a progressive like himself in voting against La Follette on November 4, he attributes a long life after death to certain structural forms in the two existing parties. He fails to attribute sufficient vitality to the destructive and constructive possibilities of an economic and political ferment, which just in so far as it spreads, will furnish economic groups with sufficient motive and momentum to break through old partitions and set free new political forces. The old parties are undoubtedly constituted so as to give every possible support to the existing partitions. That is an outstanding reason why they are so essentially conservative and why a realistic progressive agitation must begin by challenging and transforming them. But these partitions are obstacles which progressives will seek to overcome rather than towering mountain ranges which forbid them to pass. Whether they succeed or fail is a gamble, but it is not, as Mr. Lippmann alleges, a hopeless gamble. It is, on the contrary, conspicuously a not very formidable instance of the kind of gamble which progressives have always had to take and will always have to take in so far as they propose to modify the established institutions of society.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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The House of Representatives Shall Choose

WHATEVER may be the ultimate hope of Senator La Follette and his supporters with regard to the establishment of a new party, the chance of immediate success apparently lies in their ability on the one hand to elect a sufficient number of senators and representatives in sympathy with their views to give them the balance of power in the next Congress, and on the other hand to attract sufficient support from both the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates to prevent either of them from obtaining a majority of the electoral votes, and so to throw the election into the House of Representatives. The moment this latter intention was believed to be a reasonable possibility, one began to hear the usual diatribes against independent movements, and to be told, also quite in accord with customary political practice, that this particular purpose was subversive of the Constitution because it was a deliberate attempt to thwart the will of the people of the United States.

The present writer holds no brief for La Follette, and has no expectation of voting for him, but as a student of the Constitution, and especially of its origin, his historical conscience or—what is pretty much the same thing—his sense of fair play protests against this misinterpretation of what the framers of the Constitution had in mind. * In fact, he would go so far as to say that Senator La Follette probably unconsciously, but none the less certainly, is attempting to realize more nearly what the Fathers expected would be the outcome of the method established by the Constitution for electing the president, than if a plurality or even a majority of the popular vote were allowed to decide.

With the outbreak of the Revolution, each of the newly independent states had set up a government of its own under a written constitution—a new thing in statecraft—and together they had established a union of the "United States of America" by means of certain articles of confederation. It is commonly believed that the Articles of Confederation were so bad and the government under them so intolerable that some new form of government was necessary and that the federal Constitution resulted. This gives a wrong impression. So-called representative republican government was in its infancy, and Americans were enormously proud of what they had done. Thomas Jefferson enthusiastically said that a comparison of our governments with the governments of Europe "is like a comparison of heaven and hell. England, like the earth, may be allowed to take the intermediate station." The Confederation was confessedly an experiment, an attempt to solve the problem of a confederated republic, and while no one would have claimed that it was perfect, most men would have agreed with Jefferson that "with all the imperfections of our present government, it is without comparison the best existing or that ever did exist."

It was generally appreciated, however, that the government under the Articles of Confederation was not meeting with the measure of success which had been expected of it, and a convention of delegates from all the states was called to meet in Philadelphia in May, 1787, for the "express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation" or, as it was elsewhere expressed, to remedy the defects "which experience hath evinced that there are . . . in the present confederation." This was the federal convention which framed our present Constitution, and the significance of what has been said above lies in the fact that the members of the convention were imbued with faith in the excellence of their own institutions and consciously or unconsciously were determined to build upon the foundations of their own experience. There was not a little philosophical speculation and political theorizing, and there was a good deal of talk about democracies "ancient and modern," but when it came to concrete action the delegates relied upon what they themselves had tested in their own colonies and states.

The outstanding weakness of the Confederation was the lack of power in Congress, and the proposals in the convention to give adequate powers to that body were readily acquiesced in, dependent, however, upon the composition of the legislature being acceptable. It is well known that the most important division in the convention grew out of the divergent interests of the large and the small states, and that this difference of interests led to the great compromise on representation in Congress, according to which membership in the one house was to be proportional to population, while in the other house each state was to have an equal vote.

The Articles of Confederation made no provision whatever for the exercise of executive and administrative functions beyond authorizing Congress "to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction." Congress did as well as it could and, considering the conditions, deserves great credit for establishing committees and boards which were more or less permanent and which laid the foundations for our present executive departments. It was, however, an

* The substance of this article is taken from the author's Framing of the Constitution, Yale University Press, 1913.

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inefficient way of doing things and the lack of responsibility was continually felt, for it is well known that what is everybody's business is nobody's business. Accordingly the lack of an executive was recognized as a distinct weakness of the Confederation, the remedy for which presented to the convention the next most difficult problem after that of the legislature, and the solution of that problem ultimately required the reconciliation of the same divergent interests of large and small states.

It will help very much to understand the difficulty of the problem if it is appreciated that the office of president was at that time unknown. The nearest approach to any such office was that of the state governor, the direct successor of the colonial governor, who had been only the representative of the Crown. In fact monarchy was the only form of national executive power the men of that time knew. There was even a marked sentiment in favor of establishing a monarchy in the United States. Several of the members said frankly that they considered a limited monarchy to be the best form of government. One of the delegates from Maryland, Dr. James McHenry, on returning to the convention after an absence of over two months, found one of his colleagues making out a list of members in attendance with "for" or "against" marked opposite almost every name. On being asked what that stood for the laughing reply was that those marked with a "for" were for a king. There were said to be over twenty names favoring a royal government. It was commonly rumored outside the convention that the Bishop of Osnaburgh, the second son of George III, was to be invited to become King of the United States. It seemed desirable to stop these rumors, and what was clearly an inspired statement appeared about the same time in various private letters, and finally in the newspapers: "though we cannot, affirmatively, tell you what we are doing, we can, negatively, tell you what we are not doing—we never once thought of a king."

The implication of the above quotation is that the injunction of secrecy upon the proceedings of the convention prevented telling what had been done, but any delegate would have been puzzled to describe what the convention was actually doing with regard to the executive. The first proposal for that office, in what is commonly known as the Virginia plan, had provided for an election by the legislature. This would have made the executive dependent upon that body. There were some who were in favor of a plural executive, that is, an administrative committee of three or five. The convention, however, although there was a widespread fear of too strong an executive power—for one hears a great deal about tyranny and the arbitrary rule of George III—preferred a single, independent executive, and that is about as far as the matter had advanced in the early stages of the convention proceedings. As the work of the convention developed, one notices a growing tendency not merely to make the incumbent of the office independent, but also to make the office itself more and more important. For example, quite early in the proceedings, in addition to the usual powers and duties, the executive was given the power of appointment in all cases not otherwise provided for, and in place of a council of revision the executive was given the right of veto. One of the clearest indications of the intention to make the office an important one was rendering the executive subject to impeachment.

As to the method of selecting the executive, it was solely a question whether or not he was to be chosen by the legislature. If he were so chosen he must not be eligible for reëlection, lest he should court the favor of that body in order to secure another term for himself. A single term of office should be fairly long. The possibility of reëlection, however, was regarded as a great incentive, and if a short term and reëligibility were accepted, the legislature ought not to do the choosing. The only solution was election by some other body, yet election by the people, which would seem to us the obvious method, was apparently regarded as visionary and impractical. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, almost the only one in the beginning to urge popular election, apologized for it as seeming to be a theoretical rather than a practical measure. The opinion upon that method seems to have been expressed by George Mason of Virginia when he said that "it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief magistrate to the people, as it would to refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the candidates." If the executive were to be chosen by the legislature, he must not be eligible for reëlection and his term should be a comparatively long one; but reëligibility was desirable, and, if allowed, the term of office should be short and the incumbent should not be chosen by the legislature. The delegates floundered round and round in this circle. In the effort to extricate themselves, various suggestions were made, such as direct election by the people, appointment by state executives, and a system of electors who might be chosen by the people, by the state legislatures, or even from the national legislature by lot. None was satisfactory.

The work of framing the Constitution was a long and laborious process. The difficulty over the composition of the legislature, which was finally settled by the Great Compromise, occupied most of the time and attention of the delegates until the middle of July. When that was disposed of, the convention again turned to the executive and found itself in the same quandary as before.

At one time the convention voted down a proposal for a system of electors to be chosen by the state legislatures, but two days later, on the suggestion that the number of electors in each state might

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be proportional to the size or importance of the states, the proposal was adopted. Again, a few days afterwards, this plan was given up on the ground that to bring the electors together for the single purpose of choosing a chief magistrate would be expensive and the best men in the distant states would not think it worth while to serve. In a similar way every possible length of term was suggested. Four, six, seven, eight, eleven, and fifteen years were the more serious proposals. Twenty years was even suggested as being "the medium life of princes," and "during good behavior" found its advocates, with four states actually voting in favor of it.

"We seem to be entirely at a loss," said Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and James Madison of Virginia added that "there are objections against every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed." It is not surprising then that, after twice reconsidering the whole question, the convention should finally come back to the original plan: an election by the national legislature, for a term of seven years, with ineligibility to reëlection.

In all these debates over the executive, while there was the greatest diversity of opinion, lines of division were not clearly marked. Members expressed simply their individual and personal points of view. For example, Gouverneur Morris actually argued on both sides of one question that was under discussion. At the same time it is noticeable that the members from the large states quite naturally favored a system which would insure to them a greater influence in determining the selection, and that this tended to bring them to the support of some form of popular election. The title of "favorite son" had not yet been devised, but the principle was recognized, for one serious objection to the method of popular election was that the people would always vote for a man from their own state, and this would give an advantage to the states with the largest populations that would probably be decisive of the election. Hence arose the proposal that each man should vote for two or three candidates, only one of whom should be from his own state. Another proposal was that the people of each state should name one man, and from the thirteen names thus selected, the national legislature should choose the executive.

Toward the end of July when the essential features of the new government had been agreed upon, the convention referred all of the resolutions thus far adopted, which were as yet quite general in character, to a committee to draft a detailed constitution, and the convention then adjourned for ten days to give the committee time to prepare its report.

Just as in the course of the convention proceedings delegates were apt to propose measures with the working of which they were familiar in their own states, so now the members of the Committee of Detail drew upon the Articles of Confederation and upon the various state constitutions. The New York Constitution of 1777 seems to have been more extensively used than that of any other state and was of especial service in connection with the executive, who was to be called the President of the United States, but whose office was modelled on that of the state governor. In the necessary elaboration of his powers and duties and in providing that in case of his death or removal he should be replaced by the President of the Senate, the committee followed closely the forms and procedure in New York.

The president's functions might be those of a governor but they were of a governor who was to be the head of thirteen states. From an official who was originally expected to be a dependent of the legislature, the executive had developed into an independent figure of importance. It is not surprising that some of the delegates were amazed and even fearful. It is true that limitations had been placed upon the president by rendering him subject to impeachment, and by making it possible to overrule his veto of legislative acts, but some further safeguard was necessary, and every one agreed that the best security would be obtained through establishing a satisfactory mode of election and a suitable term of office.

It is of no little significance that these questions relating to the executive were considered with reference solely to the future and permanent policy of the country for it was very generally accepted in the convention, and was referred to more than once as a matter of course, that George Washington would be the first president of the United States. Washington was then at the very height of his popularity and so great was the trust in him that no fear was felt regarding the inauguration of the new office. It is probable that the extent of power vested in the president was influenced by the same expectation. The important consideration in this connection is that this was a question of future policy, and it was against future dangers that the convention was guarding.

The convention readily accepted the Committee's definition of the powers and duties of the president, but an election by Congress for a single term of seven years was no more satisfactory now than it had been before. A proposal for a direct popular election was voted down by a large majority. A proposal for an election by electors chosen by the people was defeated by only one vote. Immediately thereafter upon an "abstract question" of an election by electors, without specifying by whom the electors should be chosen, the convention divided equally. Further consideration of the question was then postponed, and on the last day of August this and all other unfinished parts of the Constitution were referred to a committee of one member from each state.

The committee on the unfinished parts of the Constitution reported within a few days its plan for the election of the president. Although all of the

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ideas embodied in this report had been suggested previously in the convention, the report itself was a distinct surprise. The plan proposed was for a system of electors chosen in each state as its legislature might direct. The electors were to equal in number the state's representation in Congress, that is, including both senators and representatives. The electors in each state were to meet and vote for two persons, one of whom should not be an inhabitant of that state. These votes were to be listed, certified, sealed, and sent to the Senate of the United States. They were to be opened and counted in the Senate, and the person having the greatest number of votes was to be president, provided such a number was a majority of all the electors. In case of a tie, the Senate was to choose between them, and if no one had a majority, the Senate was to choose the president "from the five highest on the list." The person having the next greatest number of votes was to be vice-president and in case of a tie the Senate was to choose between them.

Assuming that a satisfactory method of electing the president had been discovered, the committee further recommended that the president now be given power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, and to appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court.

There was a compromise embodied in this proposed method of electing the president, which does not appear on the surface, but it was referred to so often in the course of the debates, and in later years explained by members of the convention, that no doubt attaches to it. Under the proposed system, as the number of electors from each state was to equal the number of its senators and representatives, the large states, with their greater representation in Congress, would have a distinct advantage. To offset this, when no choice by the electors resulted, the Senate was to elect from the highest candidates on the list, and in the Senate it was conceded that the small states would have the advantage. Each elector was supposed to vote independently and in accordance with his own best judgment, but it was assumed that he would almost invariably vote for a man from his own state, and so he was required to vote for two persons, one of whom should not be a resident of the state with himself. It was conceded that Washington would be chosen in the first election, but in subsequent elections it was expected that the vote would be so scattered as not to give a majority to any one person. This would throw the election into the Senate, and it was explained again and again, that under this system, the large states would nominate the candidates and the eventual election would be controlled by the small states.

The convention acted on the assumption that this would happen in the majority of cases. "Nineteen times in twenty" George Mason asserted, and a little later he claimed that forty-nine times out of fifty the vote of the electors would not be decisive. Several members of the convention thought that this would not be the case, but after Mason insisted that "Those who think so ought to give up the point to those who think otherwise," it was tacitly conceded. It was quite possible that here, as in many other questions, the large states accomplished their purpose under a veil of concession. It was not for them to dispute the improbability of an election resulting in the first instance. If they had the advantage in the choosing of electors, it was certainly still more to their benefit if, contrary to expectations, the electors were to determine the result.

The chief objection to the proposed plan was the additional power that it would give to the Senate, a body which was regarded by many as already preponderant. Several proposals to allow a plurality of electoral votes to determine the choice were voted down. A proposal that the voting should be by states immediately suggested substituting the House of Representatives for the Senate, but retaining the principle of state equality. Without any hesitation and with only one dissenting vote the convention adopted this substitute. This action was taken on the sixth of September and the committee had made its report on September fourth. Three days at the last were sufficient to dispose of a question that had bothered the convention for three months.

The new method of election was intended to render the executive independent of the legislature and to do away with intrigue and corruption. Earlier proposals for a system of electors had generally assumed that the electors would meet together in one place. It is amusing to read, in the light of present day developments, that one member at least "urged the extreme inconveniency and the considerable expense of drawing together men from all the states for the single purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate." One wonders what he would have thought of the recent Democratic convention. We should have more sympathy with the fear that a meeting of electors would offer too tempting an opportunity for corruption. At any rate the new plan tried to steer clear of these dangers by providing that the electors should meet in their respective states. Voting at the same time and at such a distance from one another "the great evil of cabal was avoided." A similar precaution was taken in the provision that when the votes were opened in the presence of Congress, if it was found that no one had a majority, "then the House of Representatives shall *immediately* choose by ballot one of them for president." Just what was included under that dreaded "cabal," it would be perplexing to say. Besides intrigue and corruption there may have been a vague idea of political parties, but certainly there was no conception of a party organization that was to play havoc with the convention's carefully devised plan.

The members of the convention seemed to be prouder of the method that had been devised for

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electing the president than they were of any other feature of the Constitution, and they seemed to regard it as having solved the problem for any country of how to choose a chief magistrate. There was not the same satisfaction felt with the Vice-Presidency. In fact one of the members of the committee reporting the plan frankly admitted that the officer "was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time." Particular objection was made to his being forced upon the Senate as its presiding officer. The convention, however, accepted the committee report in this particular and, when the ultimate election of the president was transferred to the House of Representatives, it retained the provision with regard to the Vice-Presidency that in case of a tie the Senate was to choose.

It is well known that this method of presidential election broke down with the development of political parties. In the election of 1800, the organization of the Democratic-Republican party was so perfect that its two nominees, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, received not only a majority but an equal number of electoral votes. When the House of Representatives thereupon proceeded to carry out its duty of choosing between them, two unexpected dangers presented themselves. The contest was so bitter and feeling ran so high that there was a possibility on the one hand that out of spite the election would be given to Burr instead of Jefferson, and on the other hand that no choice would be made before the fourth of March.

This experience resulted promptly in a formal proposal to change the Constitution, which was adopted by the necessary three-fourths of the states, and just before the next presidential election was held in 1804, it was proclaimed to be in force as the Twelfth Amendment. This provided that the electors should distinguish between the president and vice-president and should cast separate ballots for each. The other regulations regarding the Presidency remained the same, except that in case the ultimate election was thrown into the House the choice was limited to the three persons standing highest on the list of those voted for.

The amendment then proceeds: "And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President . . . before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President." And it further provided: "of the whole number of Electors appointed, . . . if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President."

If, then, the approaching presidential election is indecisive, and the ultimate choice is left for Congress to make, it seems clear that the contingency was not merely provided for, but that the framers of the Constitution would have regarded it as perfectly normal and quite in accordance with their expectations.

MAX FARRAND.

A Soldier in Politics

OSWALD MOSLEY is twenty-eight years old, a world-war veteran and one of the most brilliant members of the British House of Commons. He is the heir to an English baronetcy and the son-in-law of Lord Curzon, foreign minister in the Stanley Baldwin Cabinet and one of the stalwarts of English Converatism. By all traditions, Mosley should be as staunch a Conservative as any in the British Isles—and there are some who are very staunch. But he isn't. Some months ago amid the gasps of the high-hats, he "crossed the House" and threw in his lot with the British Labor party.

"I did it," he told me last summer, "because I am an ex-service man, and Ramsay MacDonald stood and still stands for the things for which I fought. He's our best bet that England will make good on its war ideals."

I returned from Europe wondering where American ex-service men, like myself, could find such a "best-bet." I've looked, rather carefully, at the three party platforms and the records of their candidates. I've finished looking with the conviction that, for the first time, the men who served in khaki have a candidate and a chance to realize on the pledges that were made to them when they were needed to fight, and forgotten when the fighting stopped. The truth is that Robert La Follette stands for precisely those fundamentals in the United States that ex-service men made the basis for their allegiance to Ramsay MacDonald in England.

And I'm not thinking of the bonus. There is another—vastly greater—debt that the country owes to its fighters. The most important pledges assumed in the war were not in terms of money. The young men of America, when the war came on, were taken up onto a high hill where we were shown the kingdoms of the earth cluttered up with a great mass of débris—débris that had accumulated as a result of the misgovernment of the world's elder statesmen. And we were promised, then, that if we rolled up our sleeves and cleaned up that mess a new world would arise on the ground we cleared. The clearing job was fairly well done. But the pledge of a new world that was given has remained unfulfilled. The young men of America, under the leadership of Robert La Follette, can make good their claim to those spoils of the war.

I am going to vote for La Follette because

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I know it is not too late to realize on the war pledges of America to its young men and to the world.

On that issue—the war—Ramsay MacDonald and Robert La Follette stood together. They stood together against the war lies and for the truth. They dared to say, then, that imperialism and secret treaties and competitive armaments in all nations, and not the total depravity of one, made the war inevitable. MacDonald said that in the House of Commons. La Follette said it in the Senate. MacDonald was ostracized and branded as a pro-German traitor and driven from the House by those who have since admitted that he was right. La Follette was similarly ostracized and branded and if he wasn't driven from the Senate it was not because of a lack of charges.

But MacDonald kept on speaking the truth. So did La Follette. When the war ended, MacDonald was still insisting that rotten diplomacy had started it. And, to keep faith with those who fought he declared that the old statesmanship that brought it on must be succeeded by a new statesmanship. The old capitalistically dominated diplomacy must be replaced by a diplomacy of truth and service. Something more than talk must be started to make sure that the latest war was the last.

That is MacDonald doctrine. That, precisely, is La Follette doctrine. It makes foreign affairs, not a series of closed-and-barred intrigues, but an open-and-above-board business. As La Follette himself puts it:

> It is a policy of avowed peace to the world. It is a policy of non-aggression. It is a policy of co-operation with the other nations for the ending of conscription, for disarmament, for the release of subject peoples. It is a conservative policy. A policy of peace on earth and good-will toward all mankind, a policy that will mobilize the world for peace, that would free the world from conquests and release its workers for the production of wealth and for its enjoyment unpoisoned by fear.

When Ramsay MacDonald declared for that sort of policy in Great Britain, the ex-service men of the country believed him. He, like La Follette, had suffered too deeply for his faith to be mistrusted. He spoke the hopes of the young men and women of Great Britain. Up at Oxford, ancient training ground for English politicians, the Oxford Union voted for MacDonald. At Cambridge, another Conservative altar, MacDonald carried the University Union. Not Oswald Mosley, alone, but scores of the young leaders of Britain, including the son of Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservatives, joined with MacDonald and Labor. These young men and women had seen enough of the failure of every other sort of policy. They believed in MacDonald—and believed in him enough to give him a chance.

In nine months, the open-and-above-board diplomacy of Ramsay MacDonald and for which La Follette stands has changed the face of Europe. For the first time since 1919 one can say that the war may not have been fought in vain. A new spirit has entered the halls of European diplomacy. It is a spirit of confidence and trust, and under its influence the forces of understanding, to which La Follette has pledged his coöperation, are mobilizing for peace. And, more than ever, the younger generation in Great Britain realize that they have, in Ramsay MacDonald a "best bet."

All this, too, has happened because these English voters had courage sufficient to ignore the campaign of misrepresentation and villification that preceded the return of Ramsay MacDonald. It amounts to an admission of ignorance of the principles for which La Follette stands to maintain that the success of the Progressive movement would be less constructive.

Stereotyped political leadership had five years at the job of cleaning up Europe. It failed to clean up anything as completely as the present administration has failed to clean up anything. It was only when the older order politicians were supplanted that conditions took a turn for the better.

Stereotyped political leadership never had a better exponent than the present occupant of the White House. Silence and evasion mark the high-water point of his courage on every side of the vote-alienating questions that are before the country. In Massachusetts a bitter campaign is in progress against the child labor amendment. The result in Massachusetts will be of great significance for only in that state is there a referendum on the question. It is significant of the success of the President's play to win the votes of the friends and foes of every measure that both sides, in Massachusetts, quote Coolidge in support of their position.

La Follette, in every line of his record, represents an aggressive honesty that neither leaves the public in doubt of his position, nor shows him trimming sail when his position becomes unpopular. The question is whether or not the United States can afford to have a President whose qualities are any less statesmanlike.

I am going to vote for La Follette because he stands pledged to those things in which I believed when I volunteered in 1917. And because he has, to back his pledges, a public record that convinces me he will fight to fulfill them.

What if I do not agree with every detail of his method? The big aim isn't to get the world saved this way or that, but to get it saved. I won't worry about my own pet panaceas if we can put the political power of the nation in the hands of a man whose spirit, on domestic and international problems, is so aggressively honest as that of Robert La Follette. He, to my mind, is the ex-service man's candidate. To vote for him is to lay claim to the pledges that were made, in the war, to the nation's young men and that have gone unpaid.

STANLEY HIGH.

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The British Election and After

WHEN the Labor government came into power last January, it was commonly given a six months' life. It has actually had just over nine, and, amid much wailing and gnashing of teeth from lovers of a quiet life, we are plunging into the third general election in two years. The occasion of it is the defeat of the Cabinet by a combination of Liberals and Tories; the point at issue being a motion to appoint a committee to inquire into the alleged impropriety on the part of the government in breaking off proceedings against the acting editor of a communist paper, who had published an article inciting, as it was said, soldiers to mutiny.

But, as a matter of fact, the abandoned prosecution was only the occasion. For if that particular wave had been surmounted, another was already rolling up. The larger question was that of the Russian treaty—in particular the proposal for a guaranteed loan—and since the Liberals had already declared uncompromising war on that policy, the government was in the position of the missionary who was asked whether he preferred being boiled or roasted. Having received notice to quit in any case, it naturally preferred to choose its own time. The thing which is important and significant for the future of British politics is not the incident of the Attorney-General and the dropped prosecution, but the fact that Liberals, or at any rate the Liberal leaders, decided that the time had come to put the government out at all costs.

Here again, there are wheels within wheels. It was known, of course, that the proposal to make a loan to Russia would meet with strenuous opposition. As far as the Conservatives are concerned, that opposition was obviously irreconcilable: their objection was not to financial details, but to the principle of "shaking hands with murder." But it appeared possible till recently that the Liberals might take a different line. It was thought that they would not resist a loan of any kind provided that they were met on points connected with the particular terms on which the loan was to be made—matters which the government has throughout declared to be subjects for discussion and negotiation. When, quite recently, Mr. Asquith put down a motion opposing a guaranteed loan of any kind, irrespective of the conditions attaching to it, many of his own followers must have rubbed their eyes. Obviously it was a declaration of war.

There has been much speculation as to why the Liberals chose to break all bridges, and as to which of their leaders really forced the decision.

No one who is not in the inner councils of the Liberal party can answer those questions with certainty. But, whatever the explanation, the decision has a significance extending far beyond its immediate effect in precipitating an election. For consider the position. Liberalism has lived on the tradition that it is "the party of progress." It has always insisted that its true affinities were with Labor, and has complained often and bitterly at Liberals being fought by Labor candidates. Now, whatever its private reservations, Liberalism entered the election as, in fact, though not in name, the ally of the Conservatives: promptly one section of the press began to urge that there should be a formal compact between the two older parties not to oppose each other in certain constituencies, in order to increase the chance of "ousting the Socialist." The electors do not draw fine distinctions, and, once the election was begun, it was fought not on the questions which occasioned the dissolution, but the record and policy of the Labor government. The public could see that common action by Liberals and Conservatives turned the government out. They could see that Labor candidates were attacked by Liberals and Tories on the same grounds and denounced in identical language. The effect must inevitably be another nail in the coffin of Liberalism as an independent party.

Assuming that the Conservatives do not win enough seats to secure a clear majority over both the other parties, what will be the position of the Liberal party? Having turned the Labor government out, it could hardly, without covering itself with ridicule, put it in again. Nor is it certain that Labor would accept office without assurances somewhat more binding than are implicit in that quality of the Liberals which leads them to be willing to wound, but not, without anxious consideration, to strike. The alternative which remains, if the Conservatives win less than fifty seats, is for the Liberals to give their support to a Conservative minority.

From such an arrangement Labor has, in the long run, everything to gain. It has always insisted that there was as little to be hoped from one of the two older parties as the other; it has risen because of the decline of Liberalism; and the main obstacle it has had to overcome is the traditional attachment to Liberalism which still lingers, an inherited characteristic, in certain parts of the north and midlands. If the Liberal party maintains in office a Conservative government, a split in the ranks of its parliamentary representatives will be hardly avoidable, and, what is much more important, Liberal electors will crowd into the Labor party.

For Liberalism, in short, this election may well be the close of a hundred years of history—"the end of an old song." For Labor it is another step towards the straight fight with privilege and reaction which has always been its ambition.

R. H. TAWNEY.

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Anatole France

—Jamais esprit ne se montra tout ensemble si hardi et si pacifique et ne trempa ses dédains de plus de douceur. Il méprisa les hommes avec tendresse.

IN these words, spoken of the Abbé Jérôme Coignard, Anatole France has described himself. They are to be found in the introduction to the Abbé's Opinions, that book of charmingly destructive doubts and tolerances, and if we would know something of what Anatole France thought of himself, and of his world, and of himself as spectator of that world, no pages of his are more illuminating. Here, more than anywhere else, may be found what, since Anatole France would have smiled to hear it called his philosophy, we might call the expression of his frame of mind; and here are the materials from which others will reconstruct the system of a man whose system, if any, was the lack of it; and the creed of one whose strongest beliefs were always doubts. There will be many, of course, whose admiration for him excels their understanding, to forge themselves a weapon of his peaceful scepticism, to erect a frail symmetry of order from his chosen, solid disorder, to crucify him, after death, as a leader of the thought of mankind. They will make a philosopher out of him, forgetting that, in pretending to blame the Abbé Coignard, Anatole France was paying him the highest compliment: "L'esprit de système lui fit défaut. . ."

"Il méprisa les hommes avec tendresse"—unless we take the whole of what he wrote, this little phrase will describe him as well as any. It is true; it is far too brief to be all the truth. He did not think too well of mankind and he is not the first to have had that feeling, but to leave the matter there would be inaccurate, unjust. "Du mépris universel que lui inspiraient les hommes, il ne s'exceptait pas." He held men to be of slight value, himself among them; he did not think them better than they were—a great error; he did not think them worse—an even greater error, but just themselves, pathetically noble, solemn, miserable, happy, trivial, ridiculous, and himself no worse, no better. This judgment, which can be and has been arrived at by the cool exercise of reason, was in Anatole France inseparably mixed with amused affection. He despised them, he was tender toward them—these two can be felt separately, but he felt them at once, and continually, and so his feeling about men and women cannot be given a defining word, nor indeed any words which do not fall far short of the books he wrote about them. He was affectionate, but not too indulgent; merciless, without cruelty; merciful, without sentimentalism; an amused, painless executioner, if need be; a critical, generous creator; letting fall, as if casually, and without emphasis, unanswerable, unforgettable things; sympathetic alike when his disdain was uppermost or his tenderness. And even his sympathy was witty.

One can imagine him, always so smilingly, so reasonably, so diabolically detached, looking at his own life and his own work as if they were those of another man. Would he not laugh out loud at the baptism of the Penguins, and fall under the spell of the beauty, clear and slow-running like a river at early morning, of Paphnuce's journey along the Nile, and be infinitely touched and amused by M. Bergeret alone with the dog Riquet, and wonder at the profound and various and ancient learning so richly, so carelessly interwoven in the adventures of Jacques Tournebroche, and find charm even in longest, slowest pages, and a gentle, limpid excellence even in the scholarly minutiae of Jeanne d'Arc, where he has forgotten, or chosen to forget his own principle that "tout montrer est ne rien faire voir"?

Somebody not long ago said that Anatole France could not be a great writer because he was so easy to understand. Which proved that whoever made the remark did not understand him and that, ergo, Anatole France is a great writer after all. What he says, to be sure, is lucid beyond equal, there is no phrase the meaning of which is not clear as purest water. But since this limpidity is so often in the service of his doubt, of his gay certainty that the little we know is so small a fraction of the universe veiled from us, since his well-ruddered, adventurous craft skirts, by design, such dark shores of prejudice, such vast cliffs of dogma, such continents of ignorance, in what he writes the overtones of everything that is not known, not understood, perhaps never to be understood, are there to be heard by all who have ears. By the luminous pilgrimage of his private sun through darkness we can learn what light is, and what darkness, and how gay and laughing and unconquerable a light it is beside that darkness.

Speculations vain and discouraging may tempt us, asking what fruit the seeds sown by this tender, sceptical, mocking mind may bear in our time. A sweetly acid fruit, subtly filled with a celestial disillusion which may be the food most needed by those who, "hot for certainties in this our world," reject it as poison. But there is little use in hoping that everyone will love Anatole France, and understand and wish their hearts—as much one could not hope from their minds—to be like his. One's final estimate of him must be purely personal, based on affection, on gratitude, on the memory of enchanted hours with M. Bergeret, with Riquet, with Paphnuce, Tournebroche and Jérôme Coignard, hours of effortless magic, of a rippling stream of contented discontent, of infinitely sharp, unmurderous irony, of silver prose flowing with candid certainty. . .

ROBERT LITTELL.

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COMMUNICATION

Why One Woman Supports La Follette

THE reasons for voting for any candidate are always difficult enough to formulate. But when one is a bird of no particular feather, as I am, shaping an answer to the voter's dilemma becomes a painful process of searching around in one's mind, to find the fragments of mental processes lying there, in order to set them up and make them look like orderly, self-conscious reasons. Some of this ex post facto reasoning even a particular bird may do and no doubt does. But if he be a professional "radical," a Leaguer à outrance, a "wet" or a "dry"—to say nothing of party Republicans and Democrats—he has at least some criteria ready to hand around which all his peripheral vagueness may sooner or later collect.

None of these helps have I. And being also a woman, I am without a single political habit or tradition, not even the pull of historical perspective, to fall back on. I know men whose considered judgment tells them to refrain from voting this year because there are no issues at stake of sufficient importance. There's also my friend who after giving the matter careful thought has planned to go hunting over election day. I know women, to be sure, who are loyal working Republicans or Democrats or self-styled Progressives. But I am what a woman voter may logically be expected to be, from her background and training and too-recent education, as shorn of pre-election ties as a new-born lamb.

And yet I have a vote.

One of the first things which brings me to La Follette is that I find I cannot vote for either Coolidge or Davis. Because I am a free-will voter, the reasons why are more relevant to my final choice than if I had a parti pris. What I call "personal" reasons figure rather prominently in these—a fact for which I have no apology, holding that they form some part of every voter's response to a candidate, legitimately enough, provided they are not carried to an extreme. We all know the woman who objects to a particular candidate's face, and I know one who thinks no lady could vote for a man named "Al" who is known to be a "wet."

If anything had been needed to strengthen an instinctive reluctance to follow Mr. Coolidge, the gradual revelation which the investigations last spring afforded of him would have been enough. For it was then borne in upon me slowly that the disclosures aroused no shock or surprise or burning moral indignation in the President. It was evident that he meant to dissociate himself from them as effectively as possible, as he and his spokesman did by constant reminders that he was not responsible for the appointments of the previous administration and by blanket announcement that no evil-doer should go unpunished—but that he would act so as to aid the speedy fading out of public memory, in pursuance of his policy of "getting by" by saying nothing. He was one of the first to minimize the scandals and so, instead of sharpening the public sense of what constitutes high character in public office, actually increased public indifference to it. This willingness to stifle moral sensitiveness for ends shrewdly calculated in advance filled me with cumulative distrust. Unless my interpretation is wrong—and every voter is entitled to his own interpretation of the public acts of public men—I cannot see how I am to feel any other way. As for Mr. Coolidge's general outlook on life, his constant harping on "economy at home and abroad," and the dreary predominance of the small thrifty, New England virtues make me feel, though a Puritan off-shoot myself, spiritually alien to the movement which surrounds and is determined to admire and extol the President.

Mr. Davis meant nothing to me when nominated but an agreeable public figure with no salient features to attract or annoy. His speeches have left me in this initial apathy. None of his campaign views sound like his own warm familiar convictions. Even the indignation with which in his acceptance speech he clothed his comments on Republican corruption, sounded to me like heat generated for the occasion. In the fight which is being waged in certain quarters over the question whether or not Mr. Davis is a liberal, I find myself heartily with the sceptics. Mr. Davis's psychology seems to me a good deal like that of the small boy as Christmas approaches. The reasons which my friends give for voting for him—that he will "take us into the League," that he is a gentleman at last, that he uses such good English, that he is a very distinguished lawyer, that they cannot vote for La Follette—none of these moves me out of the direction into which I am settling with more and more ease as time progresses. Mr. Davis by his speeches reveals himself a person with a singularly "private" point of view, considering his rather many years in public life—a man who does not like to do his thinking in terms of the many rather than of the few, but would prefer to return to the comfortable narrowness of a private life, where he may indulge his likes and prejudices without stopping to care what anybody thinks.

In contrast to the stultification of one candidate and the unconvincing tepidity of the other, the concreteness of Mr. La Follette makes a clear appeal. He stands for definite ideas and practical applications of ideas to institutions. I may not "like" all of them. Some of them I do not understand and if they were explained to me would understand only as much as I were told—not enough to make my judgment worth anything. But I can understand what he has done in Wisconsin, and how. And I can grasp the implications behind the fact that so many of the legislative proposals presented to Republican conventions by La Follette and his followers in years past, and rejected by them, have since become law.

All this definiteness reveals an outlook that I like. *This* candidate has spent his life for causes in which he has believed. *There* is the record for anyone to read. Moreover, I believe the impetus behind his life has been devotion to causes and not ambition for selfish ends. If pressed, I could give reasons for thinking so, but the explanation is probably deeper than reasons. I have so often seen the same set of facts produce fundamentally opposite judgments in men that I have come to believe opinion is in the last analysis as inexplicable as instinct.

I like Mr. La Follette's "pacificism." It seems to me, a pacifist myself since the last war, a brave and clear-

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sighted thing to have protested against our going into that war. No one suggests that he was an obstructionist after we went in, and not even the militarists suggest that it is unpatriotic to protest against war. When then, I should like to ask, is it pertinent to protest against a particular war, if not when a nation is pausing on the brink of it?

It is my interest in the future prospects of peace which leads me to think Mr. La Follette has a more fundamental grasp of international relations than either of the other candidates. Organization and machinery are vital to peace, but themselves depend upon a change in the motives which move nations to war. Therefore Mr. La Follette's long fight to curb the exploitation of the smaller nations of Latin America gives me hope that his method of furthering international coöperation will be one I can trust. His scepticism of the League does not trouble me because I partly share it. Moreover I do not believe any President can keep the United States out of the League if the people preponderatingly want to go in. All candidates, for the matter of that, stand on the Democratic platform.

Is he trying to "undermine the Constitution?" I do not know. But even a layman, or worse still a laywoman, can understand that the Constitution is a matter of interpretation, like the Bible. The interpretations are made by nine men, or rather, it may be, by five of the nine. Therefore what becomes sacrosanct and cannot thereafter be touched forever and ever is but the opinion of one man, who happens to agree with one group of four of his brethren rather than with the other four. After I have thought this far, it does not seem so terribly dangerous to change the Constitution. The cries of "dangerous radical," "revolutionary," "wild man," which are hurled into the air do not frighten me, for I have a comfortable conviction which fortifies me against social-economic alarms. It is that revolutions, when they come, are produced by masses rather than by individuals, and its corollary, that there are enough forces of resistance in *our* world at least, to keep any revolutionary movement from going too fast. This may be mere phlegm, or the compensating optimism of one who is not a property-owner.

As I look back over this analysis of my voter's mind, I see that what I have said is substantially this: That I choose La Follette because he has concreteness, and because I feel he is, of the three candidates, the most generous-minded and unfettered—if the word weren't so cheap I should say, to be short-handed, the most democratic.

Thin and vague, and yet—I recall to mind some of the arguments of my intellectual friends, reasons to them apparently conclusive. And I feel less humble.

PHYLLIS MACDONALD.

Cambridge, Mass.

CORRESPONDENCE

What the A. A. U. P. is for

SIR: The review, published under the caption A Professorial Fiasco in the New Republic of May 28, on the report of a committee of the American Association of University Professors on the dismissal of seven professors from the University of Tennessee, rests in some of its essential parts on a serious misconception of the functions of the Association which inadvertently has led the New Republic to an erroneous interpretation of the attitude of the committee.

The objects of the Association are stated as follows: "To facilitate a more effective coöperation among teachers and investigators in universities and colleges and in professional schools of similar grade for the promotion of the interests of higher education and research, and in general to increase the usefulness and advance the standards and ideals of the profession."

The Association is a professional organization similar to the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association.

The function of the Association is to lead the way in raising our colleges and universities to the highest levels of efficiency in the diffusion and promotion of knowledge for the intellectual and material welfare of mankind. To this end its activities cover a vast field, which it has but begun to invade. When the foundations of an institution are shaken, as in the case of the University of Tennessee, it is important, as the New Republic insists, to know what it all means. To this end the Association undertakes to establish and publish the facts, with the coöperation of the faculty and of the administration. Neither is investigated in a prejudicial sense. We have no quarrel with administrations. The facts should speak for themselves. The New Republic's terse indictment of the policies of the University of Tennessee disproves the charge that the report lacked the information to which the public is entitled. Even if the New Republic had to read between the lines, it did not find it difficult to interpret the facts.

A little further reading of the lines of the report, not between them, I hope will convince the New Republic that the Association does not grant that an institution can avoid its obligations of considerate treatment to an individual professor by pleading its policy of making appointments only from year to year, although it may have the law on its side. Universities are the nurseries of ethics, not of technicalities.

It is difficult to reconcile the New Republic's statement that the Association is interested not in universities, etc., but in the professorial caste, as defined only by rules of tenure with the fact that the Association is constantly investigating problems relating to the high mission of institutions of learning, etc., as set forth in its constitution and that it has published notable contributions in this field.

The Tennessee report is the report of a committee. It was published for the information of the members of the American Association of University Professors, and of the public, and will be considered by the Association as a whole at the annual meeting to be held in December at Washington.

We welcome criticism and appreciate the interest shown.

A. O. LEUSCHNER,
President, American Association of University Professors.
Berkeley, Cal.

[We are very glad to be able to give to our readers the foregoing reply of the President of the American Association of University Professors to our editorial on the Tennessee case; particularly so in view of the fact that circumstances in no way connected with the case prevented the publication last June of any correspondence, favorable or unfavorable, relating to that editorial. The New Republic is well aware of the excellent work done by the Association in the past, and has often mentioned it with editorial approval. On October 1, 1915, commenting on the investigation of the University of Utah, we wrote: "As a piece of scholarly investigation and judicial analysis, the report is a masterpiece. The work is executed with the utmost impartiality and reserve, yet the reader is never left in the least doubt as to the bearing of the evidence. . . . If the Professors' Association lives up to the promise of this report, we shall have proceeded a long way on the road toward a sane and definite resolution of the problem of academic freedom." The report on the University of Tennessee failed to do so. A comparison of the text of that report with the text of our editorial will reveal a difference of emphasis which, whatever the information contained in the report, makes that document a weak description of a deplorable condition. It seemed to us important to note that fact, the more so because of our approval of the purposes and past performances of the Association.—THE EDITORS.]

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The A. P. in Paris

SIR: Your correspondent from Ithaca, who attacked the Associated Press for a blunder in translation in connection with the winner of the Filene Peace Prize, evidently knows little about the business of gathering news, or he would be more tolerant; and nothing about the personnel of the Associated Press abroad, and especially in Paris, or he would not make such a grotesque misstatement.

A hundred and one separate items come daily over the desk of the Associated Press correspondent and of other correspondents of agencies and individual newspapers in a capital like Paris. It would be physically impossible for any man, no matter how clever, to supervise personally all the translations and condensations of the daily flash news except in items of primary news interest. Like every one else in any other business in the world subordinates have to be depended upon for translation and condensing cable news. Those who do this work under high pressure and it is remarkable how well they do their work. The blunders are few and far between, and it is unfair to impute general ignorance or carelessness to a great news service because of a blunder that any one might make. In fact, one who knows French well might easily make it in translating under pressure.

The statement of your correspondent that "The A. P. recruits its purveyors of news among people totally ignorant of the country on which they are supposed to be specialists" is false. I have had the privilege of knowing A. P. correspondents and their work during fifteen years of service in different parts of the world as a foreign correspondent. I am especially familiar with the situation in Paris. The A. P. correspondents everywhere are trained and carefully selected men whose work is beyond praise. In Paris the correspondent is Elmer Roberts, who has been constantly on the job in Paris, after service in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe, for fourteen years, and whose work is regarded by the French government and by his colleagues, French and foreign, as unrivalled for its accuracy, its insight, its sense of values, and its craftsmanship.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS.

Princeton, N. J.

The Four Great Crimes

SIR: It is to be hoped that the New Republic has no intention of joining the conspiracy of silence by failing to comment in its usual vigorous fashion upon some of the latest pronouncements of the candidate it is supporting. May I call your attention to the enclosed report of a recent speech by Senator La Follette at Newark, N. J., and request full editorial explanation of the muddle-headedness exhibited in his account of the "four great crimes?"

After all, the New Republic knows something of credit and the business cycle, of the relation between national borrowing and inflation, of the influence of a fall in the value of money on profits, and of the just apportionment of responsibility for land speculation in the agricultural states. I seem to recall an ingenious and moderately plausible rationalization by the New Republic of the Progressive plank referring to credit and the Federal Reserve System. The New Republic knows, in short, that this account of the "four great crimes" shows the worst sort of economic ignorance, equalling and, I believe, possibly surpassing the ignorance on the tariff exhibited by Mr. Coolidge.

Your attention is likewise called to the enclosed editorial from the New York Times of October 8 which discusses the Senator's "gigantic bribes" of pensions, bonus, etc. One sentence at least from this editorial should win your unqualified assent: "If anybody but a professed idealist had made these proposals, they would have been condemned as unblushing and debauching bids for votes." The crusade for the New Republic to lead is one against special privilege and class grants to whomsoever offered and not one which aims at substituting wholesale lower middle class or proletarian favors for the plutocratic variety to which we have been accustomed.

CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS.

Cambridge, Mass.

[The four great crimes to which Mr. La Follette called attention in his Newark speech were those of "depreciating the price of Liberty bonds and forcing weak holders to sell them at a loss, of seeking in 1920 to take advantage of the industrial depression to destroy organized labor, of utilizing the same depression to increase the monopolistic control of industry, and finally of destroying the prosperity of agriculture, through a conspiracy of the banking agencies of the country." The New Republic has repeatedly declared that it does not believe that the economic losses and sufferings emphasized by Mr. La Follette were caused by a conspiracy of banking or any other groups, but it does believe that some of this undesirable and undeserved suffering would have been avoided if the industrial and financial policy of the country had been dictated by people who were as solicitous of popular economic welfare as they were of their own private and group interests.

As to Mr. La Follette's stand in favor of the bonus, we take it to be a mistake, but it is not an "unblushing and debauching bid for votes." He has from the beginning sincerely believed that the enlisted men were entitled to some additional compensation from a government which permitted so many of the men who did not enlist to reap substantial rewards from the labors, the dangers, the anguish and the sacrifices of their fellow countrymen.—THE EDITORS.]

The Vanishing Voter

SIR: Messrs. Schlesinger and Eriksson recently stated in your columns that the basic influences accounting for the "vanishing voter" were the lessening differences between the parties and the increasing complexity of modern life. Any person who has watched recent American elections closely will agree that these factors have made important additions to the numbers of the non-voters, but that they are "basic influences" or new tendencies is another matter. In his first edition of The American Commonwealth, in 1888, Bryce commented upon the sameness of the two major American parties. A study of the ratio of active to eligible voters in the various states at different elections shows that it was not so much a lack of issues as it was a lack of competition between the two major parties that lead to a falling off of the vote. In the "peak" elections of the seventies and eighties, the balance between the two major parties was a very even one. Some allowance was made by the writers for the apathy of the voters in the one-party states in the South, but nothing was said about the inertia of the voters in such states as Pennsylvania and Vermont. The development of one party states in the North as well as in the South and the overwhelming preponderance of power held by the Republicans in some of the elections since 1896 are factors that the writers overlooked. In the alarming election of 1920 the voters in some of the "doubtful" Northern states showed few signs of "vanishing." In the state of Indiana, for instance, 75 percent of all the adult citizens voted. If allowance is made for the factor of woman suffrage, the ratio of eligible voters that turned out in this state in 1920 would certainly meet the objective test of efficient voting set up by the authors.

Some of the "minor" factors enumerated by Messrs. Schlesinger and Eriksson were: the complexity of the American election system, the mobility of the population, and the newness of woman suffrage. The reader was not allowed to enter the inner chamber where the significance of these factors was evaluated. The lack of proper safeguards to the ballot prior to 1890 may partly account for the hugeness of the vote that was cast in the seventies and eighties. On the other hand, the burdensomeness of the personal registration systems now in operation in some localities is beyond question an important cause of non-voting. Furthermore, the class of absentee voters has been increased by the growing efficiency of the means of transportation. Regarding the failure of many women to exercise the suffrage there can be little doubt. A recent study of non-voting in Chicago undertaken by Professor Merriam and myself shows something about the quantitative importance of these factors. An analysis of the reasons for not voting given by six thousand non-voters interviewed revealed the fact that physical difficulties, administrative obstacles, and disbelief in woman's voting accounted for one-half of the abstentions.

The purpose of this letter is not to minimize the importance of the problem discussed in your columns, but rather to point out another line of attack. Devices of a mechanical nature would effect but would not completely alter the present situation. A system of education is needed in the social sciences which will enable the great mass of the electorate to depend more upon judgment and less upon tradition in making up their election day choices.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL.

Chicago, Ill.

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With Benefit of Fiction

The Philosophy of "As If," by Hans Vaihinger, translated by C. K. Ogden. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. $7.50.

TRUTH, we have been told again and again by the philosophers, is the object of all thinking. But is it? Thinking is part of living. It would be strange indeed if the object and the reward of thinking were at odds with the necessities of life. A broader definition must take account of the contribution of thinking to living: the object of thinking is to facilitate living. This does not mean that whatever does so is true; but it may mean that any thinking which safeguards or enhances life is successful thinking, to which questions of truth are quite subordinate.

Indeed, that is precisely the contention of this book. Vaihinger's idea, at bottom as simple as it is startling, is that many of the most prominent and fundamental conceptions of human thought are consciously false. As conceptions they have a meaning and a value; but the things they represent do not exist. Nobody supposes that they exist. They are deliberate fabrications which men employ to facilitate their other dealings with actual reality. Vaihinger does not mean hypotheses. Neither does he mean myths. He means acknowledged falsehood. When he insists that far off, divine events are fictions in the minds of thinking people he intends to say not that they are guesses at what may be true, nor that they are legends of dubious though perhaps convincing authenticity, but that they are not true at all even in the minds that hold them. They are consciously imaginative constructs in a region of speculation that is known to be beyond the power of the intellect to establish any sort of truth. The hypothesis is a picture, formulated upon scanty data, perhaps, by constructive imagination, yet intended as the closest approximation of actuality that is possible under the circumstances. If it proves out, it will take its place among the "facts" as a true picture of genuine reality. A myth is a traditional account of certain events no longer subject to verification. But here again its character is determined by the fact that some people take it to be factually true. Fiction, the "als ob," is quite different. It is not a guess at the unknown. The thinker who employs it has no expectation of bringing it to verification. On the contrary, he intends it as an artifice, an intellectual scaffolding that will never solidify into masonry however invaluable it may be in all the building operations that go on in its vicinity.

The fictions which Vaihinger is aiming at are, of course, the sublime make-believes of religion and philosophy. Those matters of faith, about which human thinking has always turned as upon an axis, are myths in the minds of many people. For some they may even seem to be hypotheses. But their most persistent definition has been in terms of faith. Now faith, the belief in things "which you know ain't so," is precisely the artifice of "als ob." It is not a picture of the actual; it is a representation of the necessary. Logically, this discrimination is very simple. Any irrational number illustrates it perfectly. Thus a moment's reflection will reveal to anyone that the number zero (let alone infinity, or the square root of minus one) is a different sort of figure from three or quintillian. Those numbers can be reached by counting physical objects. Not so zero; it appears only through calculation, and there as an artificial entity, like the body of a corporation. For that purpose its meaning is clear; yet as a designation applying to actual objects it must always remain hopelessly absurd. "The milkmaid whistled as she milked her zero cows!" The very absence from the language of the ordinal corresponding to zero (as, third, second, first, "zeroth") shows that our habits, more discriminating than intelligence, have recognized it as a mathematical "as if."

This may seem, for an instant, an undignified interpretation of the highest attainments of the human spirit. But the theory of fiction is as serious as the conceptions with which it deals, and those are, primarily, the "ultimate realities" which mark the furthest excursions of the mind into the region beyond the finite world of material events. The dogmas of the faithful are many and various. Throughout all the flux of human civilization a constant succession of Ultimates has moved unbroken, each claiming to be the final truth and none substantiating the claim except by the internal evidence each, presumably, contains of its own superior reasonableness or authenticity. To this panorama of ultimate realities Vaihinger would apply the philosophy of "als ob" like a chemical resolvent. The reaction is immediate. Any theory of metaphysical (or theological) ultimates proves out at once as a "fictional construct." Among the unenlightened matters of faith may become confused with matters of fact. Vaihinger calls particular attention to the historical metamorphosis that overtakes any philosophy when it becomes widely diffused. Beginning as an intellectual artifice of the enlightened it gradually becomes a legend among illiterates. To the poet the gods are an aid to poesy; to the vulgar they are matters of fact just beyond the reach of immediate verification but no different in essence from any clod.

The theory of the "as if" is exciting enough in itself. But its close resemblance to certain other notions that have been reshaping contemporary thought makes it doubly interesting. This connection between fiction and mythology suggests one affinity. Another one is the unconscious make-believe that psycho-analysis has revealed. The conscious fiction which Vaihinger proposes looks like a new member of a familiar family.

Indeed, we are not wholly unacquainted with it in its own proper garb. The "als ob" is a special case of a general logical theory better known in the United States than in Germany, the "instrumental logic" of the pragmatists. Vaihinger has worked out a special interpretation of the more than rational constructions in which philosophy and theology abound; pragmatism has developed a complete account of the thinking process and a general conception of truth in which the "als ob" takes its place. Says Vaihinger, conscious fiction is not factually true, though it is valuable and significant in human life. Says pragmatism, no truth is true except in relation to the part is plays in human life. Vaihinger has made a most penetrating discrimination between factual truth and, to supply a term, inspirational truth. James and Dewey have exhibited truth not in two colors but in all the shades of the spectrum. The value of Vaihinger's work lies in its significance as supplementary to these other studies in the fictions by which men live. Its chief deficiency is that it has not recognized relationship.

C. E. AYRES.

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A Story Teller's Story

A Story Teller's Story, by Sherwood Anderson. New York: B. W. Huebsch and Company. $3.00.

MR. Anderson's story of himself is not a conventional autobiography, plodding from weary day to weary day with chronological precision and completeness. It bears the same relation to organized narrative that a post impressionistic picture bears to a landscape painting. It is all cubes and planes, thrown together somehow to catch the light. The attentive reader makes out that Sherwood Anderson was born in Ohio, where his father at first kept a harness shop and was afterwards an itinerant sign painter and lecturer with a great aptitude for the long bow. Sherwood left home early and spent many years learning life, sporting life at race tracks, farming life in field work, industrial life in a bicycle factory, military life in the Spanish War, business life as an advertising copy writer, before he came to live his real career as an artist, a teller of tales. In these years he supplemented his own experience by vast areas of conversation, in which he gathered the reports of life by others, his father, Judge Turner, Alonzo Berners, and later the New York critics Alfred Stieglitz, Paul Rosenfeld and Stark Young. When he had a run of luck in gambling or had saved a little money out of his wages he took a few weeks or months off to haunt libraries and spend days lying on his bed reading, rising at evening to walk miles through sections of the city inhabited by Negroes, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Italians, Germans or Poles. His pages thus offer a profusion of tramping, fighting, talking, toiling, seeing, reading and thinking; but it is all life, the very stuff of which human existence is, felt with extraordinary sensitiveness and rendered with no less extraordinary verve and color. The record gains in vividness and reality, as do many of Mr. Anderson's stories, by the fact that he does not impose a pattern, even a simple chronological order, on his material, but lets that material possess him in retrospect and tell itself in a form which is inherent in its substance and grows with its unfolding. The book is less notable as an account of physical than of mental activity. The life stuff passes directly into consciousness and becomes, in a real sense, experience. One of the books which impressed Sherwood Anderson is The Education of Henry Adams. He might have called his own story The Education of Sherwood Anderson; and the book might be offered as a sort of compendium of the curriculum of life as opposed to that of the schools.

Mr. Anderson's education was directed, at first instinctively, later with more and more intelligence, to the making of an American artist. This is the chief distinction of his story, that which gives to it its highest value. The stages of his advance are clear enough. He had first the example of his father, whose true vocation was as teller of tales. He became more and more aware of the opposition in America of the last decade of the nineteenth century, between mere material striving and the spirit which includes success and failure and all of life in its comprehension and sympathy. "Aha," he cries, "you Stephenson, Franklin, Fulton, Bell, Edison—you heroes of my Industrial Age, you men who have been the gods of the men of my day—is your day over so soon? In the end, I am telling myself, all of your triumphs come to the dull and meaningless absurdity, of say a clothes-pin factory." He realized the sterility of the divorce between the formal culture of America, personally directed from New England, and the immense cultural inheritance of the country through its absorption of a hundred racial strains. "In my own time," he writes:

> I was to see the grip of the old New England, the Puritanic culture, begin to loosen. The physical coming of the Celts, Latins, Slavs, men of the Far East, the blood of the dreaming nations of the world gradually flowing thicker and thicker in the body of the American, and the shrewd shopkeeping money-saving blood of the northern men getting thinner and thinner . . . I have never for a moment subscribed to the philosophy of life as set forth by the Saturday Evening Post, the Atlantic Monthly, Yale, "Upward and Onward," "The White Man's Burden," etc. There was always within me a notion of another aspect of life—at least faintly felt—a life that dreamed a little of more colorful and gaudy things—cruelty and tragedy creeping in the night, laughter, splashing sunlight, the pomp and splendor of the old tyrants, the simple devotion of old devotees.

Thus inspired Sherwood Anderson one day walked out of his factory, through which he was in a fair way to join the ranks of the successful go-getters, Rotarians, and members of the Council of National Defence, and though compelled for a time to support his family by writing advertisements, selling to his fellow men things they didn't want, he had his feet firmly set in the ways of literature.

Sherwood Anderson does not give the history of his successive books, Windy McPherson's Son, Marching Men, Winesburg Ohio, Poor White, The Triumph of the Egg, Many Marriages, Horses and Men. To him they are all parts of one endeavor, to reveal the world in which he found himself, and the lives of his fellow beings. Mr. Anderson is usually counted as a realist, and this in one sense he is. He has an amazing faculty of perception and feeling in the presence of phenomena and they stir him to ardent imaginative experience. This is the greatest of his gifts, his power of extending by imagination the fragments of life which come to him in such affluence and fraught with such meaning. As a child he felt the opposition between life and his own fancies; he writes of trying to bring these fancies more closely into the world of the actual. "Later," he says, "I worked for many years as a laborer in many places, and gradually as I stood all day beside a lathe in some factory . . . I began to look at other men and to wonder what absurd fancies went on in secret within them." This is clearly a romantic extension of realism; one cannot fail to be reminded of Stevenson's plea for the reality of the inner life of men "who do not live by bread alone, but by some cherished and perhaps fantastic pleasure; who are meat salesmen to the external eye and possibly to themselves are Shakespeares, Napoleons or Beethovens."

An example of the power of even trivial and humble circumstance to stir him to creative activity Mr. Anderson gives with an eloquence which Wordsworth might have used in depicting the influence of nature or Ruskin that of the pre-Raphaelite painters. He was looking out of his window one day upon a neighbor's garden, where a man was picking potato bugs off the vines, and his wife

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All Those Who Believe In "Amurrican" Histories For "Amurricans"

All those who believe that school children should be taught chauvinistic history exaggerating the country's virtues and prowess, and soft-pedalling its faults—

* * *

Will not like Albert Guérard's "The New History: H. G. Wells and Voltaire" in the November number of Scribner's Magaizne.

* * *

History "had been long enough a machine of war against all forms of radicalism" when Wells, van Loon, Robinson, and the others began work, he says.

* * *

Dr. Guérard is French in origin but has been in this country for more than a decade, has taught in Texas, and is now on the faculty of the University of California, Southern Branch.

* * *

He says: "Would to God that instead of treading in the foot prints of Barbarossa, Jagellon, or Louis XIV, Europe would study its history in terms of the coming United States."

* * *

But he spares no words concerning certain schools of history, especially that which claims to record "things as they actually happen."

* * *

Reaction, Romanticism, and the Historical Spirit, often went hand in hand in the nineteenth century, he points out.

* * *

But before the nineteenth century there was Voltaire. And after the nineteenth century, the voice of Voltaire is still heard.

* * *

Dr. Guérard proceeds to reconstruct the figure of the master, which has faded from the popular mind leaving only his mocking grin behind; and to point out his connection with the "new history."

* * *

It is a witty and sincere article written from a liberal point of view by the man who punctured the Napoleon myth with "Reflections on the Napoleonic Legend."

* * *

It is in this number of Scribner's Magazine, too, that Ramsay Traquair dips into the future and sees "The Coming Commonwealth of the Pacific."

* * *

Discussing America's share, Mr. Traquair points to our three civilizations and poses the question of whether the Pacific can be greatly influenced by San Francisco or Vancouver, or even from the Philippines.

* * *

The yellow races would be able to chase out missionaries who are trying to Americanize China, if they should win a war blundered into by America. The United States could win nothing, he says. This is only one of his ideas on the interesting subject of the growing Pacific civilization.

* * *

Whether the Atlantic and Pacific commonwealths can exist side by side is one of the questions of the world tomorrow.

* * *

These are the two leading features of the November number of Scribner's Magazine.

* * *

And if you have time for a smile or two, read "Kids and Campaigns," by Walter L. Whittlesey, and "Temperance Novels," by Edmund Lester Pearson.

* * *

The "Amurricans" will not like us this month. But we believe there are intelligent Americans who will.

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was scolding him for having forgotten to bring some sugar. "I was unconscious," he writes, "of a dinner being put on a table downstairs in my house, unconscious of any need of food I would ever feel again, unconscious of the regime of my household, of the affairs of my factory. A man and a woman in a garden had become the centre of a universe about which it seemed to me I might feel in joy and wonder forever." This rapture in the face of the teeming reality of the world is the source of that strange almost uncanny excitement which we feel in Mr. Anderson's most noteworthy stories—for example in The Door of the Trap and I Want to Know Why in The Triumph of the Egg; Milk Bottles and An Ohio Pagan in Horses and Men. His absorption in reality passes over into mysticism. As The Man in the Brown Coat in the former volume says: "I'll tell you what—sometimes the whole life of this world floats in a human face in my mind. The unconscious face of this world stops and stands still before me." It is this life of the imagination, his own and that of his fellows, that Mr. Anderson knows is really important; the actual world is a gateway to it.

To reveal the creatures of his imagination as it works on life is the purpose of Mr. Anderson's art.

> There are so many people in that land of whom I should like to tell you. I should like to take you with me through the gate into the land, let you wander there with me. There are people there with whom I should like you to talk. There is the old woman accompanied by the gigantic dogs who died alone in a wood on a winter day, the stout man with the gray eyes and with the pack on his back, who stands talking to the beautiful woman as she sits in her carriage, the little dark woman with the boyish husband who lives in a small frame house by a dusty road far out, in the country.

Such stories as these are wandering among the realities about him, naked, waiting to be clothed, while he sits, to use his own figure, like a tailor fashioning garments for them. The characters are the children of his own body, Wing Biddlebaum, Hugh McVey, Elizabeth Willard, Kate Swift, Jesse Bentley. "They had lived within me, and I had given a kind of life to them. They had lived for a passing moment any way in the consciousness of others beside myself." And through this creative effort Mr. Anderson thinks of himself and of every artist, as in the great tradition of refashioning the world of crude material to meaning and beauty. As he sits looking at the wonder of the Cathedral of Chartres, he reflects: "Always wood for carvers to carve, always little flashing things to stir the souls of painters, always the tangle of human lives for the tale-tellers to mull over, dream over." In telling of his entrance into this tradition and this possession, Mr. Anderson has written a story of spiritual adventure, a fascinating and moving revelation of the artist's mind.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

The Iron Chancellor

Bismarck and German Unity, by Munroe Smith, New York, Columbia University Press.

TWENTY six years ago Professor Munroe Smith published in the Nation a biography of Bismarck which was worthy to serve as a model for subsequent political biographers in America. It was brief, clear and adequate. In its justice and its sense of true proportions it was like a steel engraving done by a master of the old school. Many huge books on Bismarck have appeared since, but Munroe Smith's book remains the classic biography.

Much new material on Bismarck and his policy has come to light since 1898, and has been studied and pondered over by Munroe Smith. Some of it was worked into the 1910 edition of his book; more of it was used in a brilliant article on Military Strategy versus Diplomacy, published during the war. It has now been drawn upon in a thorough revision of the original work on Bismarck. But with all the new material the picture remains essentially the same. It is just as classical in its restraint and lucidity. Munroe Smith stands almost alone in his power to resist the temptation of writing a big book instead of a little book of great distinction.

When the war broke out there was a natural tendency in the Allied countries and in America to impute the German policy of aggressive militarism to the Bismarckian tradition. That was clearly an error. Bismarck's whole ambition was to achieve German unity, to create a satisfied nation, above the need of territorial aggrandizement, free to develop its internal resources and win for itself an increasingly powerful place in the family of nations. Bismarck sinned against his principles in annexing Alsace-Lorraine and Danish Sleswig and he knew it. He was apologetic about these acts of violence, and certainly did not regard them as precedents for further aggressions upon neighboring states. He foresaw clearly that an aggressive territorial policy would induce powerful coalitions which might jeopardize his great work of German unification. Some of his comments on the dangers lurking in the policy of Wilhelm III read startlingly like prophecy, in the light of later events.

Bismarck is not a sympatheic figure, but nevertheless one of the most interesting in the history of statecraft. Like the lesser German statesmen who brought their Fatherland to disaster, Bismarck was distinguished by a candor which was often brutal. But Bismarck could better afford to be candid. He knew his problem as his successors did not. He was able to weigh the relative forces that might be brought into coalition against Germany, and what was even more important, he knew the value of such imponderables as the good opinion of the world. In her present distress Germany is bitterly in need of a statesman of such qualities as Bismarck possessed: patriotism and force of character, but above all else, intelligence and sureness of judgment as to when action may prosper and when it is wisest to wait.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Contributors

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STANLEY HIGH is a newspaper correspondent, the author of China's Place in the Sun, and The Revolt of Youth. He has just returned from Europe, where he has been making a study of liberal movements.

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